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Bank Entry and Deregulation
Commercial banking in the United States is a highly
regulated industry. Banking regulations pervade
almostevery aspectofthe business, including
whether, how and where a bank can do business.
Ostensibly, the primary rationale for banking
regulation is to protect and promote the safety and
soundness ofthe financial system. Indeed, as bank
failures have mounted recently, some have called
for a reversal of deregulation.
As a legacy of the 1930s, many banking regulations
and laws were implemented that restricted com-
petition among banks and between banks and
other financial institutions perhaps because of the
mistaken belief that "excessive competition" was
the cause ofthe widespread bank failures ofthe
1930s. For example, both entry restrictions, such as
government control ofchartering, and restrictions
that do not deal with entry, such as consumer de-
posit rate ceilings, at least have the potential to
reduce competition. Although these anticompeti-
tive regulations do notdeal directly with bank risk
taking, a reduction in competition would lead to
"above-normal" profit levels (j.e., above the level
that would be earned under full competition). And
above-normal profits, in turn, may reduce the rate
of bank failures by acting as a cushion against a
threatening drop in the demand for bank services
ora sudden large increase in thecost of providing
those services.
Currently, many restrictions on bank competition
are breaking down. Deposit-rate ceilings essentially
have been eliminated on all but business checking
accounts. Geographic restrictions on bank expan-
sion are diminishing through the liberalization of
branching laws and through regional interstate
agreements. Product-line distinctions between
banks and nondepository financial firms also are
blurring. Is banking becoming more competitive
and thus less profitable, and will bank failures con-
sequently mount as profits decline? Orwill
deregulation merely change the way banks com-
pete rather than increase the overall degree of
competition?
In this Letter, Iargue that the answer to these
questions depends in large part on whether bank
entry is market-determined or restricted by regula-
tion. In banking, regulatory impediments are the
primary potentially significant barrier to entry - a
barrier to entry being acost borne by a firm seek-
ing to enter an industry that is not borne by a firm
already in the industry. Thus, this Letterfocuses on
how regulation may have affected entry into bank-
ing and neglects possible nonregulatory barriers.
Data for the period 1921-1983 are analyzed to
determine whether and how regulation has
affected the rate of bankentry in the past.
Entry and competition
Entry plays a prominent role in the economic
theory of competition. Unrestricted entry is a key
economic force that ensures there are neither too
few nor too many firms in a particular industry and
thatindividual firms charge competitive prices and
operate efficiently. Above-normal profits con-
stitute a strong lure to entry in an industry with too
few competitors. New firms will be attracted to
such an industry until profits and prices are forced
down to competitive levels. Similarly, below-
normal profit levels will induce firms to leave an
industry until profits and prices rise to competitive
levels.
Entry and the threat of entry are also strong forces
that tend to prevent private arrangements to
restrict competition, such as cartels, from being
successful or even from forming in the first place.
Cartels will be successful only if they can limit
competition among their members andalso pre-
vent potential new entrants from competing.
Just as private attempts to restrict competition and
to raise profits (such as cartels) generally will be
unsuccessful in restricting competition unless entry
also is limited, so will government regulations. This
is because competition can take place along so
many dimensions that it is virtually impossible to
regulate all forms of competition from new
entrants. As George Stigler stressed in a now classic
article written in 1968, "When a uniform price is
imposed upon, or agreed to, by an industry, some
orall of the other terms of sale are left unregu-
lated." For example, competition through quality,
advertising, convenience, and by providing under-FRBSF
priced services along with the good whose price is
regulated may all be effective forms of what has
come to be known as "nonprice" competition.
Thus, even when direct price competition is
prohibited by regulation, in the absence ofentry
regulations, new firms will be attracted to an indus-
try with above-normal profits and will compete
along nonprice dimensions. They will spend more
to enhance the nonprice attributes of the regu-
lated good until profits are forced down to com-
petitive levels. With entry regulations though, this
competitive pressure by new firms will not be
present.
The government, unlike private groups, does have
strong enforcement tools to prevent entry by new
firms. For example, in banking, entry can be con-
trolled through chartering and branching regula-
tion. Until recently, the governmenteffectively
prohibited entry into the interstate trucking, airline,
and long distance telephone industries. With entry
strictly regulated, even without other forms of
regulation, above-normal profits are the norm.
Moreover, with strictly regulatedentry, other
forms of anticompetitive regulations, such as
prohibitions on price cutting, generally will lead to
even larger profits at the expense of the public.
In sum,the regulation of price has the potential to
increase the profits of regulated firms to above-
normal levels, butonly if entry is also limited by
regulation. Whetherentry regulation has actually
reduced the rate ofentry and thus created above-
normal profits in banking is an empirical question
to which we now turn.
Effects of chartering
The United States has a "dual" federal-state bank-
ing system. Currently, persons wishing to start a
bank can apply for a federal charter from the
Comptroller of the Currency ora state charter from
the appropriate state banking agency. However, to
obtain federal deposit insurance, state banks must
either receive approval directly from the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or become
members of the Federal Reserve System. (Federally
chartered banks are all members of the Federal
Reserve System and all have federal deposit
insurance.)
In general, competition among chartering agencies
would seem to limitany single agency's power to
restrict entry. This is because if one agency
severely restricted entry, firms would seek charters
from other agencies. Overtime, an agency with an
overly restrictive chartering policy should find itself
with few firms to regulate.
Prior to the passage of the Banking Act of1935,
which set up a federally administered "needs" cri-
teria for chartering federally insured banks, there
was active competition between the states and
the federal government for the chartering of banks.
However, with the passage of the Actand the
creation of the FDIC, the competition for the char-
tering of insured banks was probably reduced
since the owners of state-chartered banks had to
apply either to the FDIC or the Federal Reserve to
obtain federal deposit insurance. In this way, the
federal governmentcan now control the number
of (federally) insured banks even though the power
to do so is diffused through three agencies.
Previous studies
A classic 1965 study by Sam Peltzman concluded
that competition for chartering was reduced by the
passage of the Banking Act of1935. He found that
the federal control of charteringreduceo the rate
of bank entry at least 50 percent, based on a com-
parison of the rate ofentry before 1936to the rate
during the 1936-1962 period. Below, I take another
look at these data and extend the analysis from
1962 through 1983, the last year for which com-
plete data are currently available.
Afurther analysis
Although, according to Peltzman, the Banking Act
of1935 and the creation of the FDIC did substan-
tially lessen state-federal competition for the char-
tering of insured banks between 1936 and 1962,
there was still interagency competition between
the FDIC, the Comptroller, and the Federal Reserve.
More recently, as S&Ls have gained more and more
bank-like powers (such as making commercial
loans and offering checking accounts), the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, which controls the char-
tering of federally insured thrifts, may have
increased the degree ofcompetition among
federal agencies for chartering. Because of this
actual and potential competition among chartering
agencies, it may well be that chartering would
become a less and less effectiverestriction to entry
over time. Thus, below, we lookatentry rates dur-
ing the post-1962 period in addition to those dur-
ing the 1921-1962 period analyzed by Peltzman toMichael C. Keeley
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The recent deregulation of banking, in particular
the removal ofdeposit-rate ceilings on almost all
types of consumer accounts, appears to be taking
place in an environment inwhich entry restrictions
have been effectively eliminated or at least have
been substantially relaxed. If so, recent consumer
deposit rate deregulation should have little or no
long-run effects on the profitability of the banking
industry as a whole because the effectively/
unrestrictedentry prior to this phase of deregula-
tion would have ensured that bank profitability
was at normal, competitive levels when the
deregulation began.
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However, individual banks may have had different
experiences as they made the transition from non-
price to price competition. Further, if entry restric-
tions had been effectively removed prior to de-
posit rate deregulation, then deregulation, by
eliminating the inefficiencies inherent innonprice
competition, should have led to an expansion of
the banking industry relative to its nonbank com-
petitors. This, in turn, would increase incentives for
entry and may explain the very high entry rates of
the last few years.
Entry rates (the number of banks opening in agiven
year divided by the numberof banks in existence
at the end of the previous year) are plotted in the
chart. For the period 1921-1935, the average rate
of entry was about 1.7 percent per year. In con-
trast, during the 1936-1962 period, the average
rate ofentry declined to only .7 percent a year, a
statistically significant decline of approximately the
same magnitude found by Peltzman. Part of this
decline was likely due to a reduction in the
demand for charters, especially during the 1930s.
However, the fact that entry rates remained low
even after the Depression suggests that chartering
also had changed. Thus, the evidence supports the
notion that achange in chartering caused a signifi-
cant decline in the rate of bank entry during the
period following the passage of the Banking Act of
1935 up to 1962.
see if entry rates have remained low or whether
they have increased.
On November15,1961,James Saxon was
appointed Comptroller of the Currency. He was
widely regarded as a proponent of the national
banking system and was viewed as being more
liberal toward chartering than his predecessors.
The data in the chart suggest that his policies
initially raised these rates significantly. However,
by the last year of his tenure (1966), entry rates
had fallen back to the pre-Saxon level. One reason
for this decline may be the credit "crunch" of
1966-1967. After the crunch, entry rates resumed
their sharp upward rise and followed acyclical pat-
tern unique to the post-1962 period.
Looking at the 1963-1983 period as a whole, entry
rates averaged essentially the same as during the
1921-1935 period. Thus, it appears that Saxon
began an era in which entry into banking was no
more difficult than during the relatively unre-
stricted period ofchartering before the Banking
Act of1935. If correct, this means that banking has
become a more competitive industry, at least since
1962. However, another interpretation of the data
in the chart would be that entry restrictions werl:!
gradually relaxed beginning perhaps as early as
1950. In either event, currently, entry does not
appear to be significantly restricted by regulation,
at least in comparison to the pre-1930s era.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investmentsl 2 192,960 - 211 11,649 6.4
Loans and Leases1 6 174,464 - 286 12,059 7.4
Commercial and Industrial 51,203 - 227 1,244 2.4
Real estate 63,970 166 3,320 5.4
Loans to Individuals 35,179 70 6,170 21.2
Leases 5,396 - 1 355 7.0
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,578 - 12 - 304 - 2.5
OtherSecurities2 6,919 88 - 104 - 1.4
Total Deposits 198,603 - 521 10,162 5.3
Demand Deposits 47,382 - 970 3,814 8.7
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 31,637 1,074 2,346 8.0
OtherTransaction Balances4 14,277 480 1,746 13.9
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,944 - 31 4,602 3.4
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 44,992 24 7,168 18.9
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000or more 37,797 27 - 3,098 - 7.5
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 20,774 - 1,576 1,861 9.8
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures














1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change